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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 2, Number 16 (September 9, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
DEFENSE COUNCIL 
Kokoshin's in, Baturin's blasting off? 
President Yel'tsin has chosen Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin to 
replace Yuri Baturin as Secretary of the Defense Council. (Interfax, 28 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-240) Kokoshin will also head up a newly-created State Military 
Inspectorate within the presidential administration. Yuri Baturin, who retains his 
position as a presidential aide, is said to have been tasked with looking into the 
situation aboard the Mir Space Station. While some reports indicate that Baturin 
has undergone cosmonaut training (ITAR-TASS, 26 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-238), 
it seems unlikely that he will be carrying out an on-site inspection. It would 
appear that supervision of the crisis-ridden space station has become the 
administrative exile once represented by oversight of the agricultural sector. 
 
President Yel'tsin has also once again postponed the meeting on military reform 
from mid-September to October. (ITAR-TASS, 18 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-240) 
 
APPARAT 
General Dima (Yakubovsky) gives rambling prison interview 
Dmitri Yakubovsky, currently imprisoned on theft charges, provided his unique 
insights into Kremlin intrigues in an interview published by Moskovsky 
komsomolets (1 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-245). Claiming his arrest was politically 
motivated, Yakubovsky blames former presidential bodyguard and security 
services' chief Aleksandr Korzhakov for his imprisonment. Korzhakov and former 
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FSB head Mikhail Barsukov are also responsible for the bloody confrontation with 
the parliament in 1993 and the war in Chechnya, according to Yakubovsky. 
 
Yakubovsky, who may be best known for his involvement in the whirl of 
corruption charges that spiraled around former Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi 
and several other top Kremlin officials in the Spring and Summer of 1993, claims 
authorship of a plan to resolve the conflict between the president and parliament. 
His suggestion was to woo opposition members over to the president's side. 
Korzhakov and Barsukov however, corrupted his recommendation: "They took 
the mechanism proposed and instead of switching people over, they simply 
destroyed them." 
 
Beyond expressing his bitterness over his imprisonment and his hostility towards 
"Sasha and Misha," Yakubovsky raises an interesting issue in his discussion of 
the Russian criminal court system and investigatory agencies, specifically in the 
vast authority of the MVD. Citing the MVD's responsibilities in "The prison 
system, the investigation, and the operatives," Yakubovsky suggests separating 
out control of the prisons from the investigatory bodies. He also notes the 
ineffectual supervisory role of the procuracy, which frequently works with the 
MVD in investigations. He further warns of a revanche of anti-presidential forces, 
particularly within the procuracy. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Rosvooruzheniye's reorganization detailed 
The state arms trading company, Rosvooruzheniye, has apparently received 
more than just a new general director (Yevgeni Ananyev); it will also be 
substantially reorganized. Dividing the company according to three of its main 
functions, two new companies are to be founded with a revamped 
Rosvooruzheniye maintaining control over the sphere of major contracts and 
weapons exports. Of the two new companies, "Promexport" will sell older 
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technology armaments and spare parts and "Russian Technology" will deal with 
licensing. (ITAR-TASS, 24 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-236) 
 
It also appears that Rosvooruzheniye, which previously was administered by the 
presidential apparat, has now firmly been established as a government-run 
organization. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has recently had supervisory 
control over the organization, and the president's decrees on reorganization 
seem to acknowledge this relationship. 
 
Nemtsov acknowledges problems with privatization, discusses Chubais 
In an interview with Moskovsky komsomolets (19 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-233), 
First Deputy Premier Boris Nemtsov described the differences among the 
government's top leaders as providing a reflection of the "current state of Russia: 
Chernomyrdin, who represents Russia Is Our Home, Chubais, who to a certain 
degrees represents Russia's Choice, and I, as a non-party person who is 
nevertheless close to the Yabloko bloc." Nemtsov apparently would not consider 
the party array visible in the parliament as perhaps more representative of the 
"current state of Russia." 
 
When asked about the conduct of privatization auctions, both this summer's 
much-disputed Svyazinvest and Norilsk Nickel tenders as well as previous 
auctions, Nemtsov sounded his now familiar theme of moving on from mistakes 
in the past. "All that was once created on the basis of exclusivity is now receding 
into oblivion and is being replaced by natural rules." 
 
Prompted to comment on Anatoli Chubais, Nemtsov calls him "one of the finest 
administrators that I have ever seen." While ascribing the dislike for Chubais to 
his red hair, Nemtsov also acknowledges that Chubais "is a hostage to the 
economic and social situation in the country," whose reputation is likely to remain 
linked to changes in people's living standard. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
U.S. hopes pacts on theater missile defense will help Duma pass Start II 
American arms control negotiators are hopeful that recent breakthroughs on 
short-range anti-missile defense systems will encourage the Russian Duma to 
ratify the Start II treaty on nuclear warheads and delivery systems. But 
Republicans in the U.S. Congress are concerned that the United States has 
given away too much, objecting especially to the pledge not to develop space-
based anti-missile systems. Negotiators from the U.S. and four ex-Soviet 
republics completed the texts of five agreements at a meeting of the Standing 
Consultative Commission (SCC) that ended on 21 August. Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakstan, Belarus and the U.S. are members of the SCC. The commission's 
largest task has been to find language that allows the development of theater-
based anti-missile systems without violating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Treaty. The 
SCC's member-states agreed in March that target missiles used in testing such 
weapons may only travel at about three miles per second and may only have a 
range of 2,200 miles. The agreement also states that no nation may develop, test 
or deploy a space-based missile defense system, long a favorite of Republican 
congressmen. (Reuters, 31 Aug 97; Johnson's Russia List #1162) On 2 
September, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev called on the Duma to ratify 
the Start II Treaty promptly. (Associated Press, 2 Sep 97; Johnson's Russia List 
#1168). 
 
Russia, suspected of testing a nuclear bomb, claims "earthquake" detected 
Monitors of nuclear explosions suspect that Russian may have detonated a 
device near the Russian island of Novaya Zemlya on 16 August, in violation of a 
five-year-old self-imposed moratorium. But Russian officials claim that the 
seismic activity was an "underwater earthquake." Unsatisfied with the Russian 
denial, the U.S. government, through its embassy in Moscow, asked for a full 
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explanation of the event on 28 August. Officials familiar with the monitoring of 
nuclear tests told The Washington Times that the international monitoring system 
was designed to filter out earthquakes. The seismic event was detected at 
ground zero, rather than beneath the surface where most earthquakes occur. 
Russia imposed its own moratorium on nuclear tests when it signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1992. The treaty has been signed by 140 
nations but has not yet come into force. Neither the U.S. Senate nor the Russian 
Duma has yet ratified the treaty. The Clinton Administration intends to submit the 
treaty for ratification this fall. (Washington Times, 28 Aug 97) Analyzing the 
Russian denial, the Jamestown Foundation pointed out that Viktor Mikhailov, 
Russia's minister of atomic energy, led a team of military and civilian experts to 
examine the site at the end of July, at which time American spy satellites and 
seismic monitors also detected suspicious activity. (Monitor, 3 Sep 97). 
 
Lebed says Russian government has lost more than 100 "suitcase" nukes 
Aleksandr Lebed, Russia's former head of national security, accused the Russian 
government of losing more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear weapons. "I don't 
know their location," Lebed said in an interview with "Sixty Minutes." "I don't know 
whether they have been destroyed or whether they are stored or whether they've 
been sold or stolen." But they were "not under the control of the armed forces of 
Russia." The former general said he suspected that they may have been left in 
former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Georgia or the Baltics. Lebed's claim 
was swiftly denied by the Russian defense ministry and by the prime minister, 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, who described it as "absolute stupidity," and "totally out of 
the question." Speaking at a European security summit in Lithuania, the premier 
said that all Russia's nuclear weapons were accounted for by the armed forces. 
(The Independent (UK), 6 Sep 97; Johnson's Russia List #1178) 
 
Primakov appointed head of commission on NATO 
At the end of August, Russian president Boris Yel'tsin appointed Foreign Minister 
Yevgeni Primakov as head of an inter-ministerial commission on cooperation with 
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NATO. Primakov was instructed to draft a statute on cooperation among the 
ministries which he thought would have input into Russia's positions at monthly 
meetings with NATO officials, as provided for under the NATO-Russia "Founding 
Act." (Informatsionnoye agentstvo ekho moskvy, 1517 GMT, 27 Aug 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-239) Primakov was given the additional responsibilities in contradiction 
to claims of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka that Primakov would 
soon be fired. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0703 GMT, 28 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
240). 
 
Russia denies Israeli claim that it provides missile technology to Iran 
Despite the accusations of Israeli journalists, Russia is not helping Tehran 
develop guidance and delivery systems for long-range ballistic missiles, Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Valerii Nesterushkin said on 26 August. The comments 
followed a report on Israeli television two days earlier that claimed that hundreds 
of Russian scientists were at work in Iran on the project. While on an official state 
visit to Japan, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed concern 
about such cooperation. British diplomats interviewed by Izvestia warned that 
"unintentional" technology transfers could result from apparently civilian 
cooperation. (RIA Novosti izvestia, 27 Aug 97; Johnson's Russia List #1152) 
 
Claims of renewed cooperation with Japan despite pursuit of fishing boats 
A five-year program for cooperation between Japan and Russia's three Far 
Eastern regions was signed on 26 August, despite continuing pursuit of 
Japanese fishing vessels by Russian border guard ships. The program, signed 
by Hokkaido Prefecture Governor Tatsuya Hori and the administration heads of 
the Primorye (Maritime), Khabarovsk territories and the Sakhalin Region in 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, is to open trade and cultivate business contacts across the 
national border. (ITAR-TASS, 1212 GMT, 3 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-246) On the 
day of the agreement's signing, a Russian border patrol ship chased four 
Japanese fishing boats away from a point off Sakhalin Island about 12 kilometers 
inside Russian waters. (RFE/RL Newsline, 27 Aug 97) 
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Russia agrees to sell China $100 million in weapons 
A Chinese general visiting Moscow on 27 August signed an agreement to 
purchase $100 million worth of weapons, including spare parts, and discussed 
plans for further purchases with Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. Gen Liu, 
a member of the powerful committee of the Chinese politburo, reportedly sought 
to purchase licenses to produce the powerful Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jet. (Financial 
Times (UK), 28 Aug 97; Johnson's Russia List #1153). 
 
Russia signs arms deal with Ukraine as NATO enacts revised scenario 
Just as NATO troops were conducting a revised version of a war game -- an 
earlier scenario had been a thinly veiled plan to repel Russian attacks on 
Ukrainian soil -- Moscow and Kiev signed cooperation agreements on military 
intelligence and quality of munitions. Under the agreement, signed on 26 August 
in Kiev, Russia and Ukraine pledged not to spy on each other. At a joint news 
conference, Russian defense minister Igor Sergeev said the two sides had not 
resolved the outstanding issue of Soviet strategic bombers taken over by Ukraine 
after independence. (Interfax, 26 Aug 97; Johnson's Russia List #1152). The deal 
came as NATO troops were conducting "Operation Sea Breeze," a rehearsal of a 
military response to an imagined earthquake in the Crimea. The original 
scenario, in which NATO troops help Ukraine fend off a grab for the Crimea by 
"the orange country," was scrapped when Moscow complained it was 
provocative. The Crimea is 90 percent ethnic Russian. (Los Angeles Times, 29 
Aug 97; Johnson's Russia List #1157). 
 
Comment 
Is this the time to drop anti-missile defense? 
The administration's timing might have been better. In the face of rumors of 
missing nuclear devices, possible illegal explosive tests and fears that Russia is 
helping Iran develop medium-to-long range missiles, the White House has signed 
an agreement limiting the range of tests the United States may conduct in 
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preparing an anti-ballistic rocket defense. U.S. allies such as Israel now fear not 
only that the United States is turning a blind eye to Russia's indiscriminate 
weapons sales, but that it is also dropping its own shield. 
 
But the administration's agreement to limited anti-ballistic testing would be 
wrong-headed even if the headlines were not so ominous, since its premises 
simply defy the laws of international diplomacy. The Duma does not cling to 
Russia's nuclear arsenal because its Communist leaders fear an assault from 
"Star Wars," anymore than they oppose the expansion of NATO because they 
want to protect Russian soil. Both "Star Wars" and NATO expansion are, after all, 
defensive systems. The only thing each threatens is Russia's ability to bully its 
neighbors. Peace, then, will not come from the massaging of the Communists' 
wounded egos, but rather from the elimination of revanchism as a Russian 
option. Only then will democrats in Moscow have a strong case to make against 
futilely seeking glory in the prestige of raw power. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
The removal of the Tver Oblast governor is under discussion 
A group of citizens is collecting signatures in favor of a referendum on the recall 
of the oblast's governor. The governor, Vladimir Platov [a "democrat"] beat the 
Communist incumbent in the December 1995 election. The support for Platov 
was more of a vote for change than it was a vote for the "democratic" camp. The 
region is terribly poor and from time to time shuts down the October Railroad just 
to remind Moscow that the area still exists. 
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At issue is the [in]competence of the present governor. Within a few short years 
he has managed to alienate almost everyone within earshot. The now circulating 
petition for a referendum is the result of one of those temporary alliances 
between sworn enemies when a common foe crops up. Neither the "democrats" 
nor the communists/nationalists have any love for Platov, both having seen him 
as a man who has not declared his loyalty for one side or the other and is 
therefore mutually suspect. For all of Platov's bumbling attempts at autocratic 
rule making, he does seem well-intentioned. 
 
The failure of a financial institution as well as the rather creative embezzlement 
of municipal bonds by a former aide, are the catalysts for this move. However, as 
no other person is commonly acceptable to the forces allied against Platov, he 
may survive as the "known evil." In fact, a wise Platov may be presented with a 
chance to divide and conquer the opposition presently arrayed against him in the 
moment of their failure. But given his wide-eyed ideas for the future, i.e., the 
resurrection of the zemstvo, he will most likely ignore the opportunity (Obshchaya 
gazeta, 10-16 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-205) 
 
Scandal surrounds Irkutsk candidates 
Welcome to the wild, wild East. After Aleksandr Rossov, head of the Irkutsk 
Directorate for Internal Affairs, announced that candidate Ivan Shadov had been 
convicted on rape charges, Shadov's dacha was set on fire by an unknown 
arsonist. Another candidate, Viktor Mashinski, has asked the regional electoral 
commission to look into cases of violations in the pre-election campaign. He said 
that his aides and canvassers are being prevented from meeting the electorate. 
And finally, all posters supporing Irukutsk's current mayor Boris Govorin have 
been destroyed. About 50 citizens were detained by the police for breaking 
campaigning laws. Funny, it seems that the communist candidate was the only 
one to remain unaffected. 
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Some of this tomfoolery is clearly the result of the fact that Irkutsk seems to be a 
prize worth fighting for, judging by the national attention it has received. From 
Zyuganov to Lebed, national political figures were seen around town trying to 
give their candidate a boost. (NTV, 1200 GMT, 25 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-206) 
 
On 26 July 1997, former Irkutsk mayor Boris Govorin, backed by the pro-
government party Our Home is Russia, collected over 50% of the votes. Only 
about 19% of the electorate voted for the chairman of the local Russian 
Communist Party organization, Sergei Levchenko. Lebed's man, the coal 
magnate Ivan Shadov, lost by a wide margin. The results of this election can only 
mean that the enlistment of persons of national reputation to support one's 
political candidacy has its limits -- if not detriments. Clearly, all politics are local 
and the more organized a candidate's campaign -- as some have noted of 
Govorin's -- the greater the chance for success. This seems to be a lesson that 
sadly needs to be repeated for many Russian political forces. (Interfax, 1033 
GMT, 28 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-209) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Supra-national organization expands powers 
Rossiyskaya gazeta carried a story in its 2 August edition about the growing 
responsibilities of the CIS Crime Prevention Bureau (FBIS-SOV-97-161). The 
organization, initially set up in April 1993 as the Bureau for Coordinating the Fight 
Against Organized Crime and Other Dangerous Types of Crimes, has been 
expanding its functions. It recently added an analysis section and is building a 
database on "criminal formations, bosses...organizers of inter-regional criminal 
societies [and] persons hiding from the law." The bureau is headquartered, of 
course, in Moscow, is composed of representatives of CIS countries' Internal 
Affairs Ministries, and is led by a Russian major general. 
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ITAR-TASS carried a similar story on 29 August about plans being made for a 
joint meeting of "major bodies" to be held in Moscow on 2-3 December. The 
objective of this meeting is reported to be "cooperation in the implementation of 
the inter-state program for the fight against organized crime" (FBIS-SOV-97-241). 
The gathering will be chaired by the Russian prosecutor-general and will include 
representatives from the CIS Coordinating Council of Prosecutors-General, 
Council of Interior Ministers, Council of Chiefs of Security Agencies and Special 
Services, Council of Heads of Customs Services, Council of Commanders of 
Border Troops, and the tax police chiefs. It is hard to determine how these 
organizations differ in purpose from each other, or from the recently formed CIS 
intelligence service. All seem to be pursuing similar objectives, and these are 
some of the same objectives originally assigned to the 1st Chief Directorate of 
the KGB. 
 
Dates for the next CIS summit set 
The next session of the CIS Council of Heads of State will be held in Chisinau, 
Moldova, on 20 and 21 November (Belapan, 18 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-230). The 
Council of CIS Heads of Government will meet in Bishkek on 9 October 
(Belapan, 19 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-231). This would be unexceptional news if it 
weren't for the fact that the CIS charter calls for these meeting to be held on 
specific days, and not on the whim of the Russian chairman of the council. We 
can also see the amount of authority, or lack thereof, that CIS Executive 
Secretary Ivan Korotchenya has when it comes to trying to administer and 
execute the provisions of the CIS Charter. Korotchenya was able to schedule the 
meetings only after he obtained the approval of Russian President Boris Yel'tsin 
and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin. It would seem that the opinion of no 
other national leader, nor Korotchenya himself, matters much when it comes to 
the workings of the CIS executive agencies. 
 
1992 defense policy revisited 
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If the new Russian defense minister has his way, there will be a "single defense 
space in the CIS." According to him, "There is no other way out at present" 
(Interfax, 23 Aug 97; FBIS-UMA-97-235). Igor Sergeev made the comments 
while observing tactical exercises in North Ossetia. This "single space" policy is, 
of course, the exact defense policy Russia tried to impose immediately after the 
creation of the CIS in December 1991. 
 
New Russian minister for CIS affairs appointed 
According to Interfax (28 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-240), President Yel'tsin 
appointed Anatoli Adamishin to fill the post of minister for cooperation with CIS 
member countries, the post vacated by Aman Tuleev in July. Adamishin, a 62-
year-old man born in Kiev, was serving as Russia's ambassador to Great Britain 
before being appointed to his new duties. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Mark Jones 
 
MOLDOVA 
Military cooperation planned 
Chisinau's Infotag reported on 13 August 1997 that Moldova's chief of general 
staff, Colonel Vladimir Dontul, would be meeting with Ukraine's acting defense 
minister, Ivan Bejan, to discuss several topics. Items on the agenda include 
cooperation between the two nation's military ministries, training of Moldovan 
staff officers in Ukrainian institutions, and the possible formation of a Moldo-
Ukrainian battalion for use in peace-making operations. The officials will also 
discuss the use of Ukrainian soldiers in the Dniester region. 
Dniester authorities acting independently 
Aleksander Karamen, vice president of the breakaway Dniester region, acted like 
a vice president of a sovereign country recently when he claimed that his 
"republic" would delimit its borders with her neighboring countries. Karamen 
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considered Ukraine and Moldova as neighbors, disregarding all internationally 
accepted agreements that Dniester is part of Moldova. (Basapress, 21 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-234). 
 
Dniester officials also angered the commander of Russian troops in the area by 
protesting planned joint Russian-Moldovan military exercises scheduled for 
October. Several officials appealed to the commander not to provide equipment 
for the exercises, insisting that the equipment "belongs to the Dniester region and 
'is temporarily in the use of the Russian Army.'" The Russian commander, in turn, 
issued a statement accusing local Dniester authorities of "whipping up tension" 
and demanded that they stop making claims on Russian property (ITAR-TASS, 
13 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-225). 
 
UKRAINE 
Morozov expresses his views 
Kostyantyn Morozov, former minister of defense and now the counselor-envoy of 
the Ukrainian Embassy in the Benelux, clearly stated his views on how to 
guarantee Ukraine's security. Molod Ukrayiny (10 Jul 97; FBIS-SOV-97-225) 
reported that Morozov said, "The guarantees of our independence lie in 
integration into the future architecture of the Common European Security 
System." 
 
Uncertain days for Ukrainian general officers 
On 27 August, UNIAR reported that President Leonid Kuchma recently signed 
decrees appointing 40 new generals, eleven of the whom were detailed to the 
staff of the Defense Ministry (FBIS-UMA-97-239). But those officers preparing to 
pin on stars might have been shaken when, on the same day, ITAR-TASS 
reported that the Ukrainian defense ministry will be reduced by 1,000 people, and 
more than 100 general officer billets will be abolished. 
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President Kuchma also signed a decree distributing and delineating powers 
between the defense ministry and the general staff. In particular, the order 
provides for the appointment of chief of general staff by a presidential decree. 
Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Volodymyr Horbulin, 
said that the decree defines the general staff as "an agency in charge of 
arranging for defense and effective troop control." He also noted that the order 
provides for "duplication," providing for "government and civilian control of the 
army" (Interfax, 28 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-240). 
 
Sea-Breeze and Sergeev 
Ukraine participated in the NATO Sea Breeze '97 exercises during the past few 
weeks. The maneuvers were condemned by Russian leaders and protested by 
ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, especially in Crimea. The exercises, however, 
went forward as scheduled and by most accounts they were successful. But this 
wasn't the only maneuvering going on in Ukraine. As ITAR-TASS reported (29 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-241), Russia's defense minister, Igor Sergeev, paid a 
"historic" visit to Kiev while the exercises were in full swing. According to the 
paper, Kiev gave a red-carpet reception to Sergeev and reiterated Ukraine's 
"strategic partnership" with Moscow. Apparently Mr. Sergeev understands that 
timing is everything. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Armenia's Communist party pushes forward union plans 
A recent poll found that almost one-third of Armenians favor Armenia joining the 
Russian-Belarusian union. The People's Patriotic Bloc, an umbrella organization 
led by the Communist party, conducted the poll. The Communist parliamentary 
faction intends to submit the poll's findings in a draft law to the new session of 
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parliament and initiate legislation for holding a national referendum on the issue. 
(Radio Rossii Network, 1300 GMT, 16 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-228) In addition, 
the Communists have collected 800,000 signatures on a petition supporting a 
Russia-Belarus-Armenia union. (Respublika Armenia, 19 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
233) 
 
Armenia and Russia form military alliance 
On 29 August President Yel'tsin and President Ter-Petrosyan signed the Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Under the terms of the treaty, 
the parties will lend each other military assistance in the event of a security threat 
or armed attack. The states will expand military cooperation and consult each 
other if threatened with armed attack. They will also coordinate their military-
technical policies, including standardizing military hardware production. They will 
continue to cooperate closely on foreign policy and joint protection of Armenia's 
non-CIS borders. The treaty goes into force upon ratification for a 25-year term. If 
neither side terminates the treaty it is automatically prolonged for 10 years. 
(Interfax, 1045 GMT, 29 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-241) On 1 September, Russia 
announced that it would lend Armenia 249 billion rubles to ensure the safety of 
Armenia's nuclear power station. (Interfax, 1631 GMT, 1 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
244) 
 
Azerbaijani diplomats, who have reasons to regard their country as the treaty's 
primary target, rapidly aired their apprehensions. Azerbaijan's foreign minister, 
Hasan Hasanov, made a representation to the Russian ambassador in Baku, 
Aleksander Blokhin, expressing "bewilderment " and "concern" over the 
document which "put the main emphasis on military cooperation between the two 
countries." (Interfax, 1824 GMT, 1 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-244) 
 
Two weeks earlier, Armenia agreed to participate in a tripartite (Armenia, Russia, 
Azerbaijan) commission to investigate this Spring's revelation that Russia 
transferred illegally $1 billion in military aid to Armenia since the 1994 cease-fire. 
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(Snark, 1600 GMT 19 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-232) The new treaty suggests that 
those activities are now likely to be legalized. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Renegade Tajik colonel forced to flee as his supporters surrender 
Zafar Saidov, President Rahmonov's press secretary, announced that Colonel 
Mahmud Khudoiberdiev's forces had been completely defeated on 19 August, 
following their voluntary surrender to Tajik government troops the previous day 
near the district (oblast') capital Qabodiyon (200 km southwest of Dushanbe, not 
far from either the Uzbek or Afghan borders). Col. Khudoiberdiev himself had not 
surrendered, nor had he been captured yet, and although Saidov was unable to 
pinpoint his location, he quoted unconfirmed reports which claimed that 
Khudoiberdiev and a number of his closest supporters (reports of the precise 
number range from 40 to 100) had fled to Uzbekistan (Interfax, 0822 GMT, 19 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-231). According to another report, Col. Khudoiberdiev was 
seen approaching the Uzbek border by Uzbek guards, who alleged that he was 
wounded (Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0230 GMT, 21 Aug 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-233). The Uzbek foreign ministry has denied all claims that the colonel 
has crossed the border into Uzbekistan (ITAR-TASS, 1412 GMT, 20 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-232). 
 
According to Deputy Defense Minister Abdullo Habibov, at least 700 of Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's 1500 troops had voluntarily given up their arms and surrendered 
to Tajik government forces. These men were not to be punished for their actions 
while under Col. Khudoiberdiev's command, but would be given the choice of 
either demobilizing or joining Tajik government military units. Habibov also stated 
that he believed that Khudoiberdiev was hiding in the mountains in Tajikistan, 
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and that there was no possibility that he might have been able to flee into 
Uzbekistan, although he and 60-70 of his supporters had attempted to cross the 
border on the evening of 18 August, near the Uzbek village of Sangou. Uzbek 
border guards were able to repel Khudoiberdiev and his men, and the group then 
withdrew in a northwesterly direction, after which government search groups lost 
track of them (Interfax, 1208 GMT, 19 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-231). 
 
Col. Khudoiberdiev began moving his forces to Qabodiyon on 15 August 
(Interfax, 1557 GMT, 15 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-227), after having been driven 
out of his brigade's permanent headquarters near the town of Qurghonteppa by 
Tajik government troops. Khudoiberdiev left a few of his supporters in 
Qabodiyon, but moved his main contingent 20 km further south to the district of 
Shahrtuz (Radio Rossii Network, 0000 GMT, 17 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-229). 
There were reports that Yaqubjon Salimov (the former chairman of the national 
customs committee, who was driven out of Dushanbe by Colonel Suhrob 
Qosimov of the Tajik Interior Ministry during the first half of August -- see Editorial 
Digest on Central Asia for 1-15 August 1997) was trying to mobilize some 500 of 
his forces in southern Tajikistan, in order to come to Col. Khudoiberdiev's aid 
(ITAR-TASS, 0705 GMT, 16 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-228), but apparently his 
endeavors were unsuccessful. 
 
Tajik government forces launched a large-scale operation against 
Khudoiberdiev's group in their new location. Due to Khudoiberdiev's inability to 
rally the local population to his support, defections from his ranks to the 
government troops, and the government forces' overwhelming strength in 
numbers and military equipment (ITAR-TASS, 1921 GMT, 17 Aug 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-229), the colonel's defeat seemed imminent by 18 August, when 
government troops destroyed his camp in Qabodiyon and then attacked his 
supporters in Shahrtuz, of whom there were purported to be not more than 100 
left (according to Deputy Defense Minister Habibov) ( ITAR-TASS, 1928 GMT, 18 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-230). Col. Khudoiberdiev's own whereabouts were already 
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in question at this point in time -- perhaps his men gave up without too much 
resistance because their commander and his officers were no longer in the area. 
 
Comment 
Colonel Khudoiberdiev's whereabouts were still unknown by the end of August, 
and it is not at all unlikely that he was able to escape the country and take refuge 
in either Uzbekistan or Afghanistan. Khudoiberdiev served in Afghanistan during 
the Soviet-Afghan war, and has controlled a significant portion of the Tajik-
Afghan border for the past few years. Thus, he must know this area of the 
country very well and still has many allies there who would protect and support 
him. The colonel is also fairly well-acquainted with the Tajik-Afghan border area 
near Qurghonteppa, and there has been a great deal of speculation that he has 
allies in Uzbekistan who have been supplying him with weapons and other forms 
of aid. In fact, ITAR-TASS reported that the Tajik government suspected that 
Khudoiberdiev had received several large arms shipments from outside the 
country during his encampment in Qabodiyon and Shahrtuz (ITAR-TASS, 0924 
GMT, 18 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-230). In all of its official statements the Tajik 
government continued to affirm its faith in the ability and determination of the 
Uzbek border guards to keep Khudoiberdiev from crossing the border. In reality, 
however, there seem to be a number of people in the Tajik government who 
distrust Uzbekistan's intentions, and this will probably continue to provide a 
source of considerable tension for some time to come. 
 
National Reconciliation Commission's arrival in Dushanbe delayed again 
The National Reconciliation Commission, which originally was to arrive in 
Dushanbe at the end of July in order to begin implementing the steps set out in 
the inter-Tajik peace treaty, has postponed its arrival yet again, this time for 
security reasons. United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leader Said Abdullo Nuri's 
deputy, Davlat Usmon, announced on 27 August that the National Reconciliation 
Committee (NRC) delegates' arrival has been postponed indefinitely because the 
UTO battalions which are to guard the NRC representatives during their work do 
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not have adequate housing. A group of experts came to inspect the buildings 
which the Tajik government had designated as the UTO troops' barracks on 21 
August and concluded that the buildings were unsuitable for the UTO battalions' 
use, due to "military-technical" inadequacies and lack of security (ITAR-TASS, 
0903 GMT, 27 Aug 97; FBIS-UMA-97-239). 
 
200 UTO troops were slated to arrive in Dushanbe on 25 August from Tavildara 
(located east of Dushanbe, close to Gorno-Badakhshon Oblast'; it has become 
the UTO's in-country headquarters since December 1996). An additional 260 
UTO troops were expected to be transferred to Dushanbe from Afghanistan 
shortly thereafter, and Nuri himself (who is to chair the NRC) planned to arrive 
before the end of August, whether or not the second group of UTO forces had 
arrived (Interfax, 24 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-236). 
 
Rezvon Sodirov responsible for another kidnapping 
Rezvon Sodirov is once trying to put pressure on the Tajik government, this time 
in order to force them to release his brother, Bahrom Sodirov, who is being held 
on criminal charges (he and his supporters took a number of Russian journalists, 
UN observers, Red Cross workers, and Tajik government officials hostage last 
February). In July, Sodirov kidnapped the two sons of Mufti Amonullo 
Negmatzoda, the head of the Muslim Center of Dushanbe, and on 24 August he 
took the mufti himself hostage, after luring him to a secret meeting outside 
Dushanbe (Interfax, 0638 GMT, 29 Aug 97; FBIS-TOT-97-241). Sodirov then 
issued an ultimatum to Tajik authorities, demanding the release of his brother by 
30 August, in return for freeing the three hostages (ITAR-TASS, 0843 GMT, 29 
Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-241). 
 
Comment 
The source who released the news about the mufti's recent kidnapping to the 
media works in Tajikistan's interior ministry. It was also a commander of interior 
ministry troops who made a statement to the press in June, in which he predicted 
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that Rezvon Sodirov would stage another hostage-taking before the end of the 
summer, in order to secure his brother's freedom. This raises any number of 
questions about the extent of the interior ministry's knowledge of Rezvon 
Sodirov's whereabouts and activities, as well as bringing up the issue of why he 
has not yet been apprehended. 
 
Local rogue UTO commanders breach cease-fire, attack police station 
Rahmon "Hitler" Sanginov and Mansur Muakalov, both commanders of local 
United Tajik Opposition units stationed near Kofarnihon (a town located about 20 
km east of Dushanbe), attacked the town's Internal Affairs Ministry post on 21 
August as a reprisal for the arrest of three members of their units on 19 August. 
The battle between the opposition forces and the police lasted approximately four 
hours. Sanginov and Muakalov were able to take three servicemen hostage, and 
then demanded the release of the three opposition members. On 20 August, 
members of the UN mission and UTO representatives from the joint government-
opposition commission which was established to monitor the implementation of 
the December 1996 cease-fire arrived in Kofarnihon, in order to negotiate with 
Sanginov and Muakalov. They were able to reach an agreement with the two 
opposition unit commanders to exchange the hostages for the arrested 
opposition members, and the exchange duly took place on 22 August (Interfax, 
1150 GMT, 22 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-234). 
 
On 27 August several UTO members were killed by Kofarnihon district police in 
Turkobod, a suburb of Kofarnihon (Radio Tajikistan Network, 1000 GMT, 29 Aug 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-241). Internal Affairs Ministry officials reported that a group of 
opposition members launched another armed attack on a militia checkpoint and 
that the men were killed in the exchange of fire (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1108 
GMT, 27 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-239). However, UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri 
informed RFE/RL's Tajik service that all of the men had been shot in the back 
without prior provocation (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 Aug 97). Representatives of the 
UN observer's mission and of the joint government-opposition cease-fire 
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monitoring commission were sent to Turkobod on 28 August in order to 
investigate the incident (Radio Tajikistan Network, 1000 GMT, 29 Aug 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-241). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
EU negotiation plans spur further talks 
Following the selection of only one Baltic State, Estonia, for negotiations with the 
European Union earlier this summer, neighboring countries have begun to weigh 
in with support for the inclusion of all three states at the same time. Working on 
the premise that greater Baltic Sea regional security needs supersede the very 
real differences between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in terms of 
demographics, economies and domestic situations, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo 
Lipponen stated at a Nordic Council conference that Finland and the other Nordic 
countries share the clear goal of promoting the inclusion of the Baltic countries in 
the EU. (Suomen Yleisradio Network, 1430 GMT, 25 Aug 97; FBIS-WEU-97-237) 
 
Additionally, while welcoming Estonia's invitation to begin talks, foreign ministers 
from all three Baltic states called for simultaneous admission. Valdis Birkavs of 
Latvia warned that the alternative would be the reemergence of dividing lines in 
Europe. "One cannot imagine a united Europe without the three Baltic states," he 
said. (Interfax, 1753 GMT, 22 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-234) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Corruption charges leveled against Butkevicius 
Audrius Butkevicius, who as national defense minister in the early days of 
Lithuanian independence was responsible for reorganizing the Lithuanian army, 
now faces a substantial challenge to his personal and professional state-
defending himself against charges of grand fraud and bribe taking. 
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In mid-August, the Prosecutor General's Office charged Butkevicius with 
accepting a $15,000 bribe in return for promising to work towards getting a 
criminal case involving a domestic firm dropped. (Interfax, 1532 GMT, 15 Aug 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-227) The Seimas subsequently voted unanimously at an 
emergency session to lift his parliamentary immunity and to permit the 
Prosecutor General's Office to institute criminal proceedings against Butkevicius 
on charges of grand fraud as well as of taking the bribe. At that emergency 
session, Butkevicius denied the charges and claimed instead the situation was 
the result of "an act of political provocation against him." (ITAR-TASS, 1110 
GMT, 19 Aug 97; FBIS-SOV-97-231) 
 
If he is found guilty, he faces up to eight years imprisonment and confiscation of 
property. 
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